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because they may plausibly urge that they have been tempted into the trade by past legislation, while many of them can show that they have bought with hard cash their share of that monopoly, licensed by the state, of which it is now proposed to deprive them.

The author's conclusion to his inquiry is that a liquor license represents a vested interest, and that the fact that the rights or interests are "*mala in se* or *mala prohibita*" is not sufficient to debar the claim to compensation." And as to the actual position of a license-holder in England at the present time he concludes: "(1) That the legislature and the courts of law contemplate renewal as the normal course of events; (2) that this expectation of renewal is at the present time a practical certainty; (3) that the amount of capital invested on the strength of this expectation is very large and [is] distributed widely throughout the community. There is, therefore, a very strong *prima facie* case for compensation."

The essay is of value as showing just what the feeling of the English people is with reference to the question of compensation for injury to vested rights, and what claim in particular liquor license-holders have for indemnity in case the legislature should interfere with their business. The extreme temperance party in England, as is usually the case in America, is opposed to any form of compensation; and yet in view of all the facts it is more than probable that no real headway will be made toward reducing the number of licenses in England or in any other way effecting permanent temperance reform there until the right to compensation as insisted upon by Mr. Sanger is recognized. A bill embodying this principle in a satisfactory way would not only have the effect of lessening the opposition of the liquor interests, but would probably secure sufficient support from other vested interests to become law; and hence a real step toward improving the present situation would be made.

Mr. Sanger has done well the work he laid out for himself. The essay is written in a clear, concise style and in a thoroughly scientific spirit, and is a real contribution to the literature on temperance reform.

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Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order. By EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901. 8vo, pp. 463.

SOCIOLOGISTS are busily occupied today putting interrogation points to the philosophy of individualism, and they are very far away

indeed from accepting as truisms any of the fundamental theses of that doctrine. They are not at all disposed to admit that "Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual," for the simple reason that in the health of each they conceive to be involved inextricably the health of others, both of the living and of those yet unborn. The individual's health, bodily, mental and spiritual, is conceived to be an inheritance and a trust in which society, as sponsor for future generations, has a vital interest. No more are sociologists disposed to grant that it is in the least self-evident that "Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest." Mill himself perceived clearly that there is an interference with individual freedom which is legitimate and necessary, although he thought that such interference should be reduced to a minimum. Many who agree with him perfectly in that believe nevertheless that the amount of such interference requisite today is greater than he believed it to be. In any event one great concern of social science at the present time is to determine exactly the "limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence," to determine, that is to say, the proper sphere of social interference. It is to this problem that Dr. Ross has devoted his attention.

With the rise of democracy, obviously, new sorts of social constraint are put upon the individual, and social interference with his freedom becomes a very different sort of thing from government interference. It is coming to be realized that these new constraints may very easily develop into a kind of social tyranny. "Like other tyrannies," wrote Mill, again in the essay on Liberty, "the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still, vulgarly held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression. . . ." If in this selection we substitute for the idea of social tyranny, the idea of "social control" we have the fundamental thesis of what may be styled the new sociology, which is not, in its fairest forms, a special plea for a greater

exercise of liberty on the part of the individual, nor on the other hand, for a greater exercise of authority by society, but is intensely interested just now in the essential nature, extent, and origin of those constraints under which the individual lives in a civilized community. In the perfect understanding of these constraints, it is felt, lies the surest safeguard against a perversion or degeneration into some form of social tyranny of that social control and exercise of authority which is adequate and necessary—a *sine qua non* of “human development in its richest diversity.” Dr. Ross’s treatise is a decidedly creditable contribution to our philosophy of social conduct. In it he has undertaken and achieved a scientific analysis of those influences by which men living in communities are brought into subservience to social ideals, more or less highly conventionalized.

The scope of his treatise he defines within the general field of social psychology, which itself lies within the province of sociology, and embraces that “branch of knowledge that deals with the psychic interplay between man and his environing society.” In his investigation he restricts himself further to those forms of social domination that are conscious and purposeful, as distinct from more subtle and illusive influences, such as are manifested, for example, in the instinctive workings of the mob-mind, and in the vogue of fashions, customs, and conventions and public opinion. “In this book,” he says, “I seek to determine how far the order we see all about us is due to influences that reach men and women from without, that is, *social* influences,” and he, therefore, conceives his task to be “first, to separate the individual’s contribution to social order from that of society, and, second, to bring to light everything that is contained in this social contribution.” “It is investigation of the kind I have attempted in this book,” he observes, in a note appended to his concluding chapter, “that will enable society to go about the business of control in a scientific way.”

The heroic conception of society going about its business of control is, perhaps, a bit academic, and while some of Dr. Ross’s readers may have no difficulty in conceiving society so occupied, others, I am sure, will feel that something of a strain is put upon their imagination, or at least that the society which controls is not always sufficiently well defined in their own minds, whether or not it is so in Dr. Ross’s. The social entity, or *ego*, or self, becomes at times intangible and illusory—we lose our grip upon it. Perhaps it should be said rather that the very excellence of Dr. Ross’s treatment—which is in general excep-

tionally concrete and positive, in a word, scientific—itself exposes the inadequacy of conventional sociological conceptions about society. We see that the social organism is not a simple one, actuated by any single impulse, or feeling or instinct of gregariousness, or by any simple form of consciousness whatever. It is rather a plexus of more or less co-ordinate social ganglia, through which every species of human feeling vibrates more or less freely. It cannot, therefore, be so simply defined and explained as some sociologists have thought. Social forces cannot be reduced to any simple dynamic impulse. To posit back of social phenomena a "power not ourselves" that makes for good or evil, or indifferently for either, may be excellent poetry, but it is not satisfying when used as a working hypothesis in social science, except when used frankly to signify what we don't know about social forces.

It is all the more unnecessary to involve our conceptions of society in any kind of mysticism now that sociology has achieved so excellent an analysis as it has of social influences, judgments, and more or less conventionalized habits of community-feeling and community-thinking; and has explained how from generation to generation certain social dicta come to acquire overmastering prestige in the conventionalities of art, in the promulgation of laws, or in the blind acceptance of creeds, and in the fixing of social standards generally. Social judgments so established seem to emanate from some high authority, and in the course of time they acquire a momentum of their own by virtue of which they bear down opposition, and they are endowed with a sort of personality or divinity. Now and then, however, when this veil of mysticism is thrown off, or the clouds lift, one sees that the "society which controls" is after all nothing more nor less than the registered judgments of generations past, or of some ascendant social class, that the source of social forces is not at all the gods assembled on Mt. Olympus, but some petty social kitchen-cabinet where Tom, Dick and Harry have met together for their own or the common weal. The hypnotic influence of mysticism fails for the moment.

Society [says Dr. Ross in a moment of extreme frankness], society is of course a kind of fiction. There is nothing to it after all, but people affecting one another in various ways. The thesis of this book is that from the interactions of individuals and generations there emerges a kind of collective mind evincing itself in living ideals, conventions, dogmas, institutions, and religious sentiments, which are more or less happily adapted to the task of safeguarding the collective welfare from the ravages of egoism.

This "kind of collective mind" has become of late a very interesting "kind of fiction." Sociologists are writing a great deal of it, and social psychology, which undertakes to expound the workings of the social mind, has been constituted a great department of social science. The idea came into the science by way of analogy, and came gradually to be accepted as a convenient working hypothesis. Today, however, it appears often to be taken more literally; so that one can hardly determine whether this sociological bread and wine has in fact become real flesh and blood, or not. Certainly, the phrase has not been used always with scientific accuracy. Writers began to use it freely before they had attained any refinement in its definition; and this is no less true of that other phrase—now common enough, too, since its exploitation by Le Bon and other recent writers—namely, the "soul" of a people, or race, or community. Although there has been a vast deal more talking about the social mind and the social soul, than there has been done clear thinking, these conceptions in themselves, as they have been elaborated, form an interesting sequence, when related to that protracted discussion which has taken place over the question, Is society an organism, and, if so, what kind of an organism is it—physical or psychic, or psycho-physical. Sociologists today are happily less occupied than formerly with writing dithyrambic treatises on the nature of the social organism; they are subjecting social relations, customs, and institutions to critical scientific analysis, and leaving the social organism to emerge, if it will, in the course of time, out of these analyses. Of this latter sort of writing Dr. Ross's treatise is a gratifying instance.

In the recent evolution of social science, however, the time-worn analogy of society to an organism has received considerable elaboration. Of course in formal logic one can prove pretty conclusively that there is no social entity back of the analogy, that our conception is a mere phantom, the figment of an over-sensitive, or over-excited imagination, projected upon, not bodied forth in social institutions. You cannot put forth your hand and touch the living body of society, any more than Hamlet could the ghost of his own father. All your intellectual and moral converse is with men individually, not with a collective mind or soul. But formal logic is often fallacious. It has proved, for example, that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise, that he could not move at all. By a line of reasoning identical with the above, one may demonstrate that there can be no such entity as a human

being, just as easily as one can demonstrate the non-existence of a social being. Conceive, for example, a protoplasmic cell interested in his own social environment. He might reason thus :

I neither feel, nor touch, nor hold intercourse with a human being. All my converse is with other protoplasmics, more or less differentiated, to be sure, but cells none the less for all that. Some of them do more thinking than others, who do more digesting, but there can be no life outside the cell. Therefore, there can be no such creature or organism as a human being. That is a figment of my imagination which I am carrying over by analogy from my own complete tangible organism.

The logic here is fair, and as conclusive as is that applied to society itself, and the same sort of reasoning may obviously be indefinitely extended. One may as easily demonstrate the inconceivability of the protoplasmic cell, with its psychic and plasmic elements, as of the human being. Clearly what we are demonstrating all the while is our own inability to conceive how the psychic influences get themselves materialized into what we call an organism. The individual *ego* which we each superpose upon our protoplasmic and other cells, by virtue of which endowment they become human, presents to psychologists and philosophers exactly the same mystery that is presented to the sociologist in conceiving a social *ego*, self, or "power not ourselves," or social "spirit," "soul," or "mind;" and when psychologists have explained how mind is related to brain matter, they will have solved as well the mystery underlying social reactions. When biologists can explain how nerve force is conditioned in nerve and brain tissues, sociologists will undoubtedly know as well how social customs, habits, and modes of social thinking, feeling, and acting are conditioned in the social organism.

Social science began by taking over and applying to social phenomena the principles of theology. Social order, the multiplication and destiny of the human race upon the earth were conceived to be a divine order, subject to and determined by an overruling and freely intervening providence. When the advance of the natural sciences began to attack this divine order with its supernatural providences, and to explain them away as a natural order and sequence, social science became a natural science, as it appears, for example, in the writings of such men as Quetelet, Comte, and Ward, with their social physics, social statics, social dynamics, and their whole terminology borrowed from the physical sciences. Then the social order became biological,

organic, and living, and more recently still, a further genesis appears to have taken place in the development of the psychic and metaphysical character of social reactions. So that to the natural science of social physics has succeeded a psychic science of the social mind, and an ethical science of the social soul. Here, then, is the social organism complete, body, mind, and soul.

It cannot be said, however, that social science proper is as yet fully conscious of this whole nature of society. The conception is but dimly foreshadowed. Writers of Dr. Ross's school are creating a social psychology, just as earlier writers created a science of social theology, of social physics, and of social biology; but the science of sociology itself does not yet manifest any but rudimentary and unstable lines of organic structure. It is in a formless, pre-natal state. New contributions add to the volume of literature, without extending the principles of the science. So that the sociologist has especial need to bear in mind that somewhat sententious admonition of Marcus Aurelius Antonius, which Dr. Ross himself quotes in another connection : "This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to that." A little keener sense of the nature of the whole would give to the science of sociology a *selbständigkeit* which it now conspicuously lacks. It is today as a science, distinctly not on its own roots. It is a graft upon other sciences, more or less closely allied to it, natural, ethical, or social. The favorite growth upon which to graft sociological scions just at present appears to be psychology. One can hardly take up a sociological treatise that is not full of cross references to recent works in psychology; but other sciences have made their contributions too. The great sociologists—pardon the Hibernianism—have always been physicists, or biologists, or philosophers, or lawyers, or doctors, or statesmen, or men of affairs, and today they are psychologists—not regular practitioners at all. Even in literature the writing of social science, or what passes for that, is made a fine art. We have a Jean Marie Guyan with his *L'art au point de vue sociologique*, but more frequently it is sociology as viewed from art, or as the doctor, or lawyer, or merchant writes it. Erudite and valuable as these contributions to social science are, their voluminousness and absence of any common focal center, has obscured the true perspective and synthesis of the science proper. Meantime the regular practitioners stand with their eyes somewhat averted from the life about them ; they have turned their thoughts backward for the

time, and are seeking with a diligence which is certainly commendable, among primitive peoples and societies, even in insect communities, the fundamental principles of their science. Here they find social problems simpler, more easily comprehended, explained and handled. Each writer strives to get back farther into some more remote, as yet unexploited society, or to discover a new gregarious species of animal or insect, and all the while society is reorganizing, re-establishing itself, reforming, developing, and generating new social forces. The social problems of today are not those of yesterday, much less of some primitive people or savage tribe. But sociologists have been bitten, as the Chinese might say, by the evolution spider. They are seeking origins, and lo ! while they are following back the generation of some social filament, the thread is broken, and that particular line of investigation ceases to have any pull on affairs today. Their sociology degenerates into a folk-lore of no great present scientific purport. Society has taken new roots, and its vital forces have new sources. So that sociology, where it is not a graft upon some allied science, is today archaic—a reversionary and scrubby growth. It cannot, therefore, be urged as a defect in Dr. Ross's exposition that his philosophy of social control is a development rather of psychology than of sociology proper; that it is a contribution to, rather than a development of social science, but this may be noted as a matter of fact.

The whole duty of social science is to write down and expound what has been happily styled the "logic of events," to seek out and proclaim the whole truth about social institutions, customs, and creeds. One need have no fear whatever that any evil will result from "lifting the veil from those sacred recesses where are prepared the convictions and sentiments by which society holds together." Perhaps the most serious charge that can be brought against the present treatise on social control is that there is, underlying considerable portions of it, an assumption which is purely gratuitous, the assumption, namely, that the art of social control is a species of black art.

In the taming of men [says our author] there must be provided coil after coil to entangle the unruly one. Man-quellers must use snares as well as leading strings, will-o'-the-wisps as well as lanterns. The truth by all means if it will promote obedience, but in any case obedience! Hence, coupled with the social endeavor to clarify the individual's judgment on certain points, we detect an unmistakable effort to confuse, befuddle, and mislead it on other

points. Taking a leaf from the policy of nature, society learns the tricks of deception.

And so our author undertakes to examine, not only social creeds, but "the films, veils, hidden mirrors, and half-lights by which men are duped as to what lies nearest them—their own experience. This time we shall see men led captive, not by dogmas concerning a world beyond experience, but by artfully fostered misconceptions of the pains, satisfactions, and values lying under their very noses. For this the fitting terms is not *control by belief*, but *control by illusion.*" And having determined upon getting behind the scenes with his reader, and upon exposing these illusions, our author, in his concluding chapter, turns apologist :

I confess that no light responsibility is laid upon the investigator who explores the mysterious processes that take place in the soul of a people, and dissects in public the ideals and affirmations elaborated in the social mind. The fact of control is, in good sooth, no gospel to be preached abroad with allegory and parable, with bold type and scare headlines. The secret of order is not to be bawled from every house-top. The wise sociologist will show religion a consideration it has rarely met with from the naturalist. He will venerate a moral system too much to uncover its nakedness.

And, again :

One who learns why society is urging him into the straight and narrow way will resist its pressure. One who sees clearly how he is controlled will thenceforth be emancipated. To betray the secrets of ascendancy is to fore-arm the individual in his struggle with society. Therefore, "the wise sociologist" will address himself to teachers, clergymen, editors, law-makers, and judges, who wield the instruments of control; to poets, artists, thinkers, and educators, who guide the human caravan across the waste.

This is cynicism of the deepest dye, if taken seriously, and smacks a bit of melodrama whether taken so or not. The assumption that social control, even of bad men, is a sort of black art, and that the wise sociologist must have a care lest he reveal its deep mysteries is simply gratuitous. It is the sort of mediæval mysticism that fostered astrology in the dark ages, and conceived a great bugaboo in the true science of astronomy. There is no such snake in the grass as our author conceives. The "mysterious processes that take place in the soul of a people" are not, perhaps, well calculated for "bold type and scare headlines," but if anyone, particularly if a wise sociologist were disposed to "bawl the secret of order from the house-top" even, there

could be no danger at all in doing so. The wise sociologist will address himself to the leaders in thought and action, not because these are his confrères or "accomplices" in any sort of black art of social control, but because they are intelligent. He will show religion consideration, and will venerate moral systems, not because he fears to "subvert all control that does not rest upon force," by showing forth "faiths and moralities in all their nakedness as so many ways of luring a man from the pursuit of his individual welfare," but for the very simple and obvious reason that he deems such faiths worthy of respect; to be subversive of social order is by no means the essential nature of those social faiths and moralities which are worth preserving—other faiths he is bent upon exposing in all their nakedness, and to death. One who learns how and sees why he is controlled for social ends will not on that account rise up against society; he is not by being made more intelligent thereby made anti-social. In a word, the true gospel of social control is not subversive; it is only a false gospel that should not be preached in the open air, and such a gospel should not be preached at all. In submitting to social constraint men are yielding to "that logic of events," writ large, which, according to Mr. Kennan, "convinced honest men and criminals [in the mining camps of California] that unless they secured life and property within the limits of the camp, they were all likely to starve to death in the course of the winter." (Quoted by Dr. Ross.) Social control is grounded in this logic of events, where it is well grounded, and when grounded in illusions the sooner it is thrown off the better. Certainly sociologists should not conspire to keep up the illusions.

Dr. Ross's judgments, be it said in conclusion, are always sane. He is fearless in his exposition of social shams, and where his exposition appears somewhat cynical, it is perhaps due to a temperamental aversion to moral priggishness. The train of thought is always clear, the analyses of social conventions are accurate, and the whole treatment original. Our author does not pretend to have said the last word concerning social control. He disclaims any sort of predilection for his own ideas. "I am not," he says, "wedded to my hypotheses nor enamoured of my conclusions"—and in truth there is comparatively little hobby-horsing in his entire book, which impresses one as being in the best sense of the word scientific.

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